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A theorem by Shannon and the Holevo theorem impose
that the efficiency of any protocol for quantum key distribu-
tion, E , defined as the number of secret (i.e., allowing eaves-
dropping detection) bits per transmitted bit plus qubit, is
E ≤ 1. The problem addressed here is whether the limit E = 1
can be achieved. It is showed that it can be done by split-
ting the secret bits between several qubits and forcing Eve
to have only a sequential access to the qubits, as proposed
by Goldenberg and Vaidman. A protocol with E = 1 based
on polarized photons and in which Bob’s state discrimination
can be implemented with linear optical elements is presented.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Bz
In information theory one of the most fundamental
questions is how efficiently can one transmit information
by means of a given set of resources. If this informa-
tion is classical (i.e., it can be expressed as a sequence of
zeros and ones, or “bits”) a crucial theorem of classical
information theory states that if a (classical) communi-
cation channel has mutual information I(X : Y ) between
the input signal X and the received output Y , then that
channel can be used to send up to, but no more than,
I(X : Y ) bits [1]. The mutual information is defined as
I(X : Y ) = H(X)−H(X |Y ), (1)
where H is the Shannon entropy, which is a function of
the probabilities p(xi) of the possible values of X , and
is given by H(X) = −
∑
i
p(xi) log2 p(xi), where the sum
is over those i with p(xi) > 0. H(X |Y ) is the expected
entropy of X once one knows the value of Y , and is given
by
H(X |Y ) =
∑
j
p(yj)
[
−
∑
i
p(xi|yj) log2 p(xi|yj)
]
. (2)
A simple application of the above theorem reveals that
using a classical two-level system as a communication
channel (i.e., if the input signal X can take only two
values x0 and x1) one is allowed to send up to, but no
more than one bit [and this occurs if p(x0) = p(x1) =
0.5].
On the other hand, suppose one wishes to convey clas-
sical information using a quantum system as a commu-
nication channel. The sender (Alice hereafter) prepares
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the system in one of various quantum states ρi with a
priori probabilities pi, so the input signal is represented
by the density matrix ρ =
∑
i
piρi. The intended receiver
(Bob hereafter) makes a measurement on the quantum
system, and from its result he tries to infer which state
Alice prepared. A theorem stated by Gordon [2] and
Levitin [3], and first proved by Holevo [4], asserts that
if Bob is restricted to making separate measurements on
the received states, then the average information gain is
bounded by
I(A : B) ≤ S(ρ)−
∑
i
piS(ρi), (3)
where S is the von Neumann entropy, given by S (ρ) =
−Tr (ρ log
2
ρ). The equality in (3) holds if, and only if,
all the transmitted states ρi commute. Thus the amount
of information accessible to Bob is limited by the von
Neumann entropy of the ensemble of transmitted states.
The maximum von Neumann entropy of an ensemble of
quantum states in a Hilbert space of n dimensions is n,
and can be reached only if the “alphabet” defined by ρ
is a mixture with identical probabilities of n mutually
orthogonal pure quantum states (called “letter” states).
Therefore, as a simple application of the Holevo theo-
rem reveals, the maximum classical information accessi-
ble to Bob when Alice sends a two-level quantum system
(“qubit”) is one bit. This is what we will refer to as the
Holevo limit. Achieving the Holevo limit requires noise-
less quantum channels and perfect detectors, therefore
we will assume so hereafter.
Either a classical or quantum n-level system can con-
vey log2 n bits at the most. In this sense, quantum
communication is as efficient as classical communication.
However, there is a task that cannot be achieved by clas-
sical means: secure key distribution. Now suppose Alice
wishes to convey a sequence of random classical bits to
Bob while preventing that any third unauthorized party
(Eve hereafter) acquires information without being de-
tected. This problem, known as the key distribution
problem, was first solved by Bennett and Brassard [5]
using quantum mechanics. In recent years many differ-
ent protocols for quantum key distribution (QKD) have
been proposed [6–12]. Most of them share the follow-
ing features: (i) They need two communication channels
between Alice and Bob: a classical channel which is as-
sumed to be public but which cannot be altered. Its tasks
are to allow Alice and Bob to share a code and informa-
tion to prevent some kinds of eavesdropping, to trans-
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mit the classical information required for each step of
the protocol, and to check for possible eavesdropping. A
quantum channel (usually an optical fiber or free-space),
which must be a transmission medium that preserves the
quantum signals (usually the phase or the polarization of
photons) by isolating them from undesirable interactions
with the environment. It is an “insecure” channel in the
sense that Eve can manipulate the quantum signals. (ii)
A sequence of m steps. A step is defined as the minimum
part of the protocol after which one can compute the ex-
pected number of secret bits received by Bob, bs. Each
step consists on an interchange of a number qt of qubits
(using the quantum channel) and a number bt of bits (us-
ing the classical channel) between Alice and Bob. (iii) A
test for detecting eavesdropping. Alice and Bob can de-
tect Eve’s intervention by publicly comparing (using the
classical channel) a sufficiently large random subset of
their sequences of bits, which they subsequently discard.
If they find that the tested subset is identical, they can
infer that the remaining untested subset is also identical
and secret. Only when eavesdropping is not found, the
transmission is assumed to be secure.
From the point of view of information theory, a natural
definition of efficiency of a QKD protocol, E is [13]
E =
bs
qt + bt
. (4)
where bs, qt and bt were described above. This defini-
tion omits the classical information required for estab-
lishing the code or preventing and detecting eavesdrop-
ping, because it is assumed to be a constant, negligible
when compared with the number of transmitted secret
bits, mbs. The combination of classical information the-
ory plus the Holevo theorem imposes an upper limit to
the efficiency of any transmission of classical information
(secret or not) between Alice and Bob. In particular,
they imply that the efficiency of any QKD protocol is
E ≤ 1. The problem addressed in this paper is whether
the limit E = 1 can be achieved. Or, more generally,
how efficiently random classical information can be dis-
tributed between Alice and Bob (who initially share no
information), while preventing that Eve acquires infor-
mation without being detected. As a close inspection of
some of the most representative QKD protocols reveals,
so far none of them reaches the limit E = 1 (see Table
I) [14]. A QKD protocol with E = 1 requires that Bob
can identify with certainty n different states, where n
is the dimensionality of the Hilbert space of the quan-
tum channel, Hn. Bob can only distinguish n states with
certainty if all of them are mutually orthogonal. Since
there are no n mutually orthogonal mixed states in Hn,
then the letter states will be necessarily an orthogonal
basis of pure states. If the quantum channel is a single
quantum n-level system, the requirements bt = 0 and
bs = qt = log2 n are impossible to achieve, because then
Eve could use the cloning process [15,16], to find out
what was the state sent by Alice without being detected.
This problem can be avoided if the quantum channel is a
composed quantum system. Then, as was first discovered
by Goldenberg and Vaidman [9], the secret information
can be split between the subsystems, so that if Eve has
no access to all the parts at the same time, she cannot
recover the information without being detected. Golden-
berg and Vaidman’s protocol was extended and improved
by Koashi and Imoto [10].
In this Letter we will present a protocol E = 1 based
on [9,10] and on the idea of using a larger alphabet that
saturates the capacity of the quantum channel. Suppose
that the quantum channel is composed by two qubits (1
and 2) prepared with equal probabilities in one of four
orthogonal pure states {|ψi〉}, and that Eve cannot ac-
cess qubit 2 while she still holds qubit 1. To obtain this
“sequential” access for Eve, we can use the configuration
in Fig. 1 [9,10]: there are two paths between Alice and
Bob, one for qubit 1 and the other for qubit 2, and both
have the same length L. Alice sends out the two qubits
at the same time. Qubit 1 flies to Bob while qubit 2 is
still in a storage ring (protected against Eve’s interven-
tion) of length l > L/2. The aim of this storage ring is to
delay qubit 2 until qubit 1 has reached the protected part
of the channel near Bob. In that protected part there is
another storage ring of length l, so both qubits arrive at
the same time to Bob’s analyzer. To guarantee that Eve
has a true sequential access to the two qubits, Alice and
Bob (using the classical channel) must know when qubit
1 of the first pair will arrive to Bob and which will be the
delay between pairs [10].
Any QKD protocol must fulfill the fact that Eve can-
not learn the bits without disturbing the system in a
detectable way. In addition, for practical purposes, it
would be interesting if Bob could easily read the letter
states. In our protocol, the choice of letter states will be
strongly limited by these requirements. Let us denote as
pnm those orthogonal basis of letter states composed of
p product states, n nonmaximally entangled states, and
m maximally entangled states. It can be easily seen that
the letter states cannot be a 400 basis, because then Eve
can learn at least one bit without being detected. For
instance, if the basis was {|00〉 , |10〉 , |+1〉 , |−1〉}, then
Eve can learn one bit just by performing a local measure-
ment on the second qubit and allowing the first one to
pass by. In addition, the letter states cannot be a 004
basis, because then Eve can learn the two bits without
being detected just by preparing a pair of ancillary qubits
(3 and 4) in a maximally entangled state, replacing qubit
1 with qubit 3, reading the state of the combined system
1, 2 after receiving qubit 2, and finally changing the max-
imally entangled state of the combined system 3, 4 by a
simple unitary transformation on particle 4. Other possi-
ble strategies for eavesdropping in the context of sequen-
tial access, like broadcasting [17], have been investigated
by Mor [18]. Mor’s requirement to avoid eavesdropping
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(reduced density matrices of the first subsystem must
be nonorthogonal and nonidentical, and reduced density
matrices of the second subsystem must be nonorthogonal
[18]) applies to the case when two (pure or mixed) letter
states are used. As can be easily checked, Mor’s condition
is satisfied by at least two pairs of states if one uses an or-
thogonal basis of four pure states different than 400 and
004. This means that Eve must use at least two different
strategies to obtain information of the key. If for a par-
ticular state she uses the wrong strategy, Alice and Bob
will have a high probability to detect Eve. Therefore, we
conclude that an orthogonal basis of a type different than
400 or 004 can be used as letter states in a QKD protocol
with sequential access. However, these bases present dif-
ferent advantages and disadvantages. On one side, it will
be interesting to use the higher dimension of the quan-
tum channel to improve the probability of detecting Eve
from those protocols using lower dimensional quantum
channels or smaller alphabets. For instance, in a proto-
col based on two-letters with the same probability like
[5], for each bit tested by Alice and Bob, the probability
of that test revealing Eve (given that she is present) is 1
4
.
Thus, if N bits are tested, the probability of detecting
Eve is 1−
(
3
4
)N
. However, in a protocol using two qubits
as a quantum channel, if Alice and Bob compare a pair of
bits generated in the same step, the probability for that
test to reveal Eve can be 3
4
. Thus if n pairs (N = 2n bits)
are tested, the probability of Eve’s detection is 1−
(
1
2
)N
.
However, this improvement is possible only if Eve can-
not use the same strategy to (try to) read two of the four
states. This scenario can be achieved with bases such as
121, 130, or 040. However, using these bases have a big-
ger (from an experimental point of view) disadvantage:
as the analysis of some particular cases suggests, if the
qubits are polarized photons, then Bob cannot discrim-
inate with 100% success basis like 121, 130, or 040, us-
ing an analyzer with only linear elements (such as beam
splitters, phase shifters, etc.) [19]. A general proof of this
statement for any kind of basis is still an open problem.
Such proof exists for the 004 bases [20,21]. However,
bases such as 202 or 220, although they do not improve
the probability of Eve detection, can be used for QKD in
the Holevo limit, and allow Bob to completely discrimi-
nate between the four states without requiring conditional
logical gates, like CNOT gates between the two qubits,
or even electronics to control conditional measurements
on the second qubit depending on the result of the mea-
surement on the first qubit. I will present an example
of a QKD protocol in the Holevo limit of this last case.
Consider the following 202 basis:
|ψ0〉 = |HH〉 , (5)
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|HV 〉+ |V H〉) , (6)
|ψ2〉 = 1√
2
(|HV 〉 − |V H〉) , (7)
|ψ3〉 = |V V 〉 , (8)
where |H〉i means photon i linearly polarized along
a horizontal axis, and |V 〉i means photon i linearly
polarized along a vertical axis, and symmetrization
is not written explicitly [for instance, |HV 〉 means
1√
2
(|H〉
1
|V 〉
2
+ |V 〉
1
|H〉
2
)]. Alice prepares one of the
four states (5)-(8) and sends them out to Bob using a
setup to guarantee Eve’s sequential access (Fig. 1). The
two qubits arrive at Bob’s state analyzer at the same
time. In the case of the four photon polarization states
(5)-(8), Bob analyzer to discriminate with 100% (theo-
retical) success between the four states can be realized
in a laboratory using a 50/50 beam splitter, followed by
two polarization beam splitters (which transmit horizon-
tal polarized photons and reflect vertical polarized pho-
tons), and four detectors [22,23]; see Fig. 2. After the
polarization beam splitters, as a simple calculation (up
to irrelevant phases) reveals, the four states (5)-(8) have
evolved into
|ψ0〉 → 1√
2
(|D1D1〉 − |D3D3〉) , (9)
|ψ1〉 → 1√
2
(|D1D2〉 − |D3D4〉) , (10)
|ψ2〉 → 1√
2
(|D2D3〉 − |D1D4〉) , (11)
|ψ3〉 → 1√
2
(|D2D2〉 − |D4D4〉) , (12)
where |DiDj〉 means one photon in detector Di and
the other in detector Dj , again symmetrization is
not written explicitly [for instance, |D1D2〉 means
1√
2
(|D1〉1 |D2〉2 + |D2〉1 |D1〉2)]. Thus, a single click on
detectors D1 or D3 (D2 or D4) signifies detection of |ψ0〉
(|ψ3〉), while two clicks, one on D1 and the other on D2,
or one on D3 and the other on D4 (one on D2 and the
other on D3, or one on D1 and the other on D4) signifies
detection of |ψ1〉 (|ψ2〉).
Long storage rings have a low efficiency for the trans-
mission of polarized photons, so other methods to achieve
sequential access must be developed in order to perform
QKD in the Holevo limit for long distances. For instance,
Weinfurter has suggested [24] using momentum-time en-
tangled photons and a Franson-type device [25]. On the
other hand, QKD protocols with E = 1 can be extended
to quantum channels composed of n ≥ 2 subsystems with
m ≥ 2 levels, supposing Eve has only a sequential access
to the subsystems. If nm ≥ 6 Alice could use even a basis
with only product states [26], although then Bob would
need some quantum interaction between the subsystems
in order to achieve a complete discrimination of the letter
states [27].
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Scheme bs qt bt E
Bennett, 1992 [7] < 0.5 1 1 < 0.25
Bennett and Brassard, 1984 [5] 0.5 1 1 0.25
Goldenberg and Vaidman, 1995 [9] 1 2 ≥ 1 ≤ 0.33
Ekert, 1991 [6,8] 1 1 1 0.5
Koashi and Imoto, 1997 [10] 1 2 0 0.5
Cabello, 2000 [12] 2 2 1 0.67
TABLE I. Efficiency E of different QKD protocols. In Gold-
enberg and Vaidman’s protocol, bt contains the sending time
of the qubits. In Ekert’s protocol the values refer to a more ef-
ficient version, suggested by Ekert to the authors of Ref. [8],
in which Alice tells Bob her choice before Bob’s measure-
ment. Both in Goldenberg and Vaidman’s, and in Koashi
and Imoto’s protocols, qt is taken to be 2 because their quan-
tum channel is a photonic state in two paths, which is a four-
dimensional Hilbert space, although their letter states do not
span the whole Hilbert space.
State 
analyzer
(Fig. 2)
Alice Eve
Bob
SR1
SR2
qubit 1
qubit 2
State
preparation
FIG. 1: Scheme to force that Eve has only a sequential access
to the two qubits.
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qubit 2
D1
D2
D3
D4
qubit 1
FIG. 2: Scheme of Bob’s analyzer to discriminate unambigu-
ously between the four states (5)-(8).
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